

# Escenarios

Biweekly bulletin of strategic analysis addressed to the Venezuelan civil society



NUMBER 17 • SEPTEMBER 2ND, 2024


## WHAT'S NEW?

Three decisions reveal the character of the Venezuelan authorities in continuing with the disregard of the popular will expressed in the elections of 28J. The first one occurred on 08.22.24 in which the Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ) [issued a sentence on the investigation](#) carried out on the basis of the contentious appeal filed by Nicolás Maduro, in which they consider the [results offered by the CNE](#) to be valid. The judgment of the TSJ was recognized by different official institutions, including the [National Assembly](#) and the [Ombudsman's Office](#). However, it was rejected by important spokespersons of the international community: Chilean President [Gabriel Boric](#), a [joint communiqué of 11 countries](#) (Chile, Argentina, Costa Rica, Ecuador, United States, Guatemala, Panamá, Paraguay, Perú, Dominican Republic and Uruguay), the [Inter-American Commission on Human Rights](#) (IACHR), the [European Union](#) and the [OAS Secretary General](#). [Gustavo Petro and Lula da Silva](#), presidents of Colombia and Brazil, “took note” but at the same time insisted that the Venezuelan authorities must publish the results of the elections in detail.

The second is the [changes in the cabinet](#), which include the appointment of Diosdado Cabello as Minister of Interior and Justice and Delcy Rodríguez as Minister of Petroleum. In the opinion of [Luis Vicente León](#), president of the pollster Datanalisis, they mean **1)** Increase of military power over the national government, **2)** Continuity of the strategy of economic liberation, exchange anchor and control of liquidity and public expenditure and **3)** Consolidation of a more intense strategy of political and social control. Cabello has led the strategy of closing the civic space in the country, which includes the approval of a [law against NGOs](#). In addition, his appointment to this position also expresses a message within the dominant coalition: Preserve loyalty at all costs.

The third measure has been the [arrest warrant](#) against Edmundo González Urrutia, dated 09/02/24, issued by the First Special Court of First Instance with competence in terrorism cases. [Hours before](#), the prosecutor Luis Ernesto Dueñez, assistant prosecutor in charge of the 58th National Prosecutor's Office, requested the arrest warrant, accusing González of usurpation of functions, forgery of public documents, instigation to disobedience of laws, conspiracy, “sabotage to damage systems” (sic) and association. The decision was questioned in a [joint communiqué](#) of 7 countries of the region (Argentina, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Paraguay, Perú, Dominican Republic and Uruguay), [Chile](#), [Perú](#), [Spain](#), [United States](#), [Brazil and Colombia](#) in a joint communiqué, [Ecuador](#), [Canada](#) and [Argentina](#). The measure was described by [Juan Diego Quesada](#), correspondent for the Andean region of the Spanish newspaper El País, as “A gigantic step by Chavismo towards its rupture with the international community”. [Celso Amorim](#), special advisor to the Presidency of Brazil, said that if the government of Nicolás Maduro decides to move forward with the arrest of González Urrutia “it would be a political arrest, and we do not accept political prisoners”. At the closing of this bulletin Edmundo González had not been arrested.

On 09.03.24 the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) [expressed its concern](#) for the existence of a “climate of fear” in the country. [A similar communication](#) was issued by several independent UN experts. On the same day, a group of organizations, under the name “Human Rights in Venezuela in Movement”, released the report [“Post-electoral and Human Rights Crisis 2024 in Venezuela”](#). The document concludes that the actions of the authorities ratify that in Venezuela the crime of persecution for political reasons continues to be committed, a crime against humanity included in the Rome Statute; That the coordinated actions of the



different institutions of public power, aimed at fostering generalized fear as a mechanism of control and coercion, must be qualified as “*State Terrorism*”; That the serious erosion of democratic institutionality has repealed, by way of facts, 21.7% of the articles of the Magna Carta, linked to fundamental rights, for which reason a regime of exception has been established in the country by de facto means. Finally, even if the will of the people had been recognized by the current authorities, the continuous barriers erected in the electoral process, in a generalized and systematic manner, hindering the exercise of the rights of freedom of peaceful assembly and association, would also have prevented the electoral process from being qualified as “*free*” and “*fair*”. Another report was released by Human Rights Watch, [focusing on the killings](#) in demonstrations.

## HOW CAN IT AFFECT NEGOTIATION MECHANISMS AND AGREEMENTS?

[A meeting](#) between the presidents of Colombia, Brazil and Mexico with Nicolás Maduro was announced for Wednesday 09.04.24, a conversation that has been postponed. [Declarations of President Lula da Silva](#), “*I want to take care of Brazil. He (Maduro) bears the consequences of his gesture. And I face the consequences of my gesture*”, suggest that joint advocacy between Colombia and Brazil has been losing effectiveness. At the same time, declarations of President [Andrés Manuel López Obrador](#) do not help to strengthen the diplomatic initiative.

According to an official list, [57 countries have recognized](#) the victory of Nicolás Maduro. Argentina, Costa Rica, Ecuador, United States, Panamá, Perú and Uruguay [consider as valid the results](#) that would give the victory to Edmundo González Urrutia. Other countries, such as the European Union, Brazil and Colombia, maintain the demand for the detailed publication of the results, without recognizing any option as the winner. It was unofficially known that the government of the United States [would promote individual sanctions](#) against members of the electoral authority, the highest court of Venezuela, the National Assembly and the intelligence and military intelligence police.

The next political milestone will occur on January 10, 2025, when the new president officially assumes the 6-year presidential term. Nicolás Maduro [needs to reach that date](#) with a fragmented, frightened and clandestine opposition. He may continue to postpone formal talks with Brazil, Colombia and Mexico until after October 1st, after Claudia Sheinbaum takes office as president of the Aztec country. Maduro announced that institutionally Christmas [will begin in Venezuela](#) on 10.01.24, a political use questioned by the [Venezuelan Episcopal Conference](#). Horacio Velutini, president of the Caracas Stock Exchange, expressed “*The Venezuelan business sector is looking for stability and not more sanctions*”, which suggests the possibility of a normalizing offensive of the situation through an alliance between the government and the businessmen for the last months of the year. Another possibility is the [early election of](#) the year 2025.

## WHAT CAN CIVIL SOCIETY DO TO MITIGATE THE NEGATIVE IMPACTS?

- Civil society organizations should begin to prepare critical mass, **through a consensual stance**, on the inauguration of Nicolás Maduro on January 10th, 2025.
- Human rights groups must **invent and disseminate novel narrative strategies** to keep the attention of the international community on Venezuela during the last months of the year, advocating for the inclusion of the situation of democracy in all regional civil society spaces.
- The work of documenting human rights violations **must be maintained despite the difficult circumstances faced by activists**. Its main target, at this time, is international human rights protection organizations.
- The regional community, including Latin American civil society organizations themselves, should be sensitized to **the new migratory flow that includes activists and victims** of human rights violations.



Laboratorio  
de Paz

Made by:  
Laboratorio de Paz  
labpaz.org

Drafting:  
Lexys Rendón  
Rafael Uzcátegui

Translation:  
Rómulo Castillo

[To subscribe  
to this newsletter  
HERE](#)

[To read previous  
newsletters](#)

Laboratorio de Paz is a Venezuelan research and strategic thinking center, founded in 2012, which is dedicated to analyzing, disseminating and generating recommendations that contribute to the resolution of conflicts through the interdisciplinary approach of democracy, nonviolence and human rights, prioritizing communities, emerging and vulnerable based on the right to peace, civic space and cultural rights.